

**FROM MOLE TO SNAKE:
PHILOSOPHY OF INFORMATION AND DEMOCRACY**

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Abstract. The present study valorises a first documentation dedicated to the Academic Project *Contemporary Democracy under the Assault of Technology* (coord. Scientific Researcher II Henrieta Anișoara Șerban, PhD, deployment period 2026-2027), with interest [here] in bringing together several pivoting coordinates, recognized in: *Philosophy & Information, Philosophy of Information, a double Romanian theoretical model, from mole to snake – Philosophy of Information and Democracy*. The article proposes/fixes as *caputs* on the one hand, the finding that the *intelligence – mind – [artificial] intelligence* triad transgresses the status of a technological project, becoming philosophically [accepted] as an articulatory product of theories about *thinking – consciousness – knowledge*: on the other hand, the validation of the Deleuze-ian metaphor – from the mole to the snake – in the sense that “the coils of a snake are more complex than the burrows of a mole”, factually confirming the relationship/rapport between *philosophy – information – democracy*.

Keywords: *Philosophy & Information; Philosophy of Information; Democracy; Relationship between Philosophy – Information – Democracy*

Introductory Framework: Philosophy & Information

Cumulatively filing a possible debate, both conceptually and critically, about the punctuated-and-punctual-philosophical perspectives dedicated to artificial intelligence and the problematic/problem of the mind, Margaret A. Boden¹ proposes unifying– balanc(ing) – divergent-decisive positions, regarding the nature of the *intelligence – mind – [artificial] intelligence* triad, of which the last transgresses the status of a technological project and is [philosophically] accepted as the articulate product of theories about *thinking – consciousness – knowledge*. In a defining way, placement in an extended-embracing explanatory field is, in itself,

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¹ Margaret A. Boden (ed.), *The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence*, Oxford University Press, 1990.

an *unstable process* – from the *linearity* of “studying the way of building and/or programming computers, allowing them to do things that the mind can do”, to the *problematic assumption* that “computers could do what the mind can do (...) to diagnose, advise, deduce and truly understand”; to the *unattractive* “development of computers whose observable performance has characteristics attributed to mental processes”; or to the *controversial* level of “systematic theory that can explain (...) both the general categories of intentionality and the various psychological capacities they are based on”². It is thus agreed that “the philosophy of AI (considered the science of intelligence) is interrelated with the philosophies of mind, language and epistemology and is essential to the philosophy of cognitive science”.³

The announced context includes, in the *weak/cautious* vs. *hard* Turingian logic, the distinction between *weak artificial intelligence* – *strong artificial intelligence*, tensively opposing (in a functionalistic-biological manner) any mechanics tributary to the way in which machines can simulate and, at the same time, stimulate intelligent behaviours without having real mental states, to a prospective hypothesis according to which the machine would have a mind, understanding and even consciousness. In the spirit of computationalism, thinking is equivalent to symbol processing following formal rules, the mind being analogous to a program and the brain, to its material support, a system with the ability to properly manipulate symbols being considered intelligent despite the intrinsic materiality it has. Not by chance, any updating of the problem known as the Searle-ian experiment validated the demonstration according to which the exclusively syntactic manipulation of symbols remains an insufficient-processual approach in generating semantic understanding. The fundamental question [here] concerns the way in which the machine, even manifesting intelligent behaviours, would in fact resort to a subjective experience, a debate contextualized in/through the differential distinction operated between/amongst *functional intelligence* – *consciousness* concepts.

Patrick Allo, Bert Baumgaertner, Simon D’Alfonso, Nir Fresco, Federico Gobbo, Carson Grubaugh, Andrew Iliadis, Phyllis Illari, Eric Kerr, Giuseppe Primiero, Federica Russo, Christoph Schulz, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Matteo Turilli, Orlin Vakarelov and Hector Zenil⁴ proposed (in *online* consultation/use variants!) an introductory manual for the *Philosophy of Information*, explicitly pointing out the function and relevance of the field – that of having as a pivoting node concepts intended, integrated and integral to updated [conceptual] schemes, recalculated in relation to the chang(ing) realities of the moment. In this regard, the authors point out a triadic accumulation of milestones that they subsume to explicit lines of conceptual action, found in/through: the *interrogative detente* –

² *Ibidem*, p. 1.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Patrick Allo, Bert Baumgaertner, Simon D’Alfonso, Nir Fresco, Federico Gobbo, Carson Grubaugh, Andrew Iliadis, Phyllis Illari, Eric Kerr, Giuseppe Primiero, Federica Russo, Christoph Schulz, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Matteo Turilli, Orlin Vakarelov, Hector Zenil, *The Philosophy of Information – An Introduction*, The D Research Network.

“what is information?” – an objective assigned to the field of classical philosophy, in order to obtain a unified theory; deepening *innovation* by developing theoretical philosophical methods of information able to examine the useful applicability of ideas with reference to *philosophical information*; agreeing on a matrix structure that affirms and supports the fact that the *Philosophy of Information* is the “philosophy of information design (...) Since the world is made of information, this is a fundamental philosophy. The *Philosophy of Information* is the philosophy of all things”.⁵

Methodologically, the authors attach to the model the LoA (Places of Action/ Levels of Abstraction) function considered fundamental for managing any information process, including the way of thinking and practicing any set of interactions with the world. The method of Abstraction comes from scientific modeling, in the sense that the “variables” correspond to those things chosen to be observed in reality. The terminology becomes related to philosophy, without blurring its scientific-technical benchmarks – “The term *variable* is frequently used in science to represent an unknown or changing value of a measured thing. A level of abstraction is a finite but non-void set of observables, possibly moderated by transition rules. An observable is a typified variable, with a label which represents the name assigned by the epistemic agent to a feature of the system under consideration”⁶ – but agreeing on the evidence that the use of LoA has ontological, therefore implicitly philosophical, implications.

Philosophy of Information

Luciano Floridi⁷ argues in favor of an articulat(ing) domain which, terminologically, becomes able to overcome a fashionable denotative act or a combination of extendedly-oriented alternatives – *cyber philosophy*, *digital philosophy*, *computational philosophy*, *AI philosophy*, *philosophy of the artificial* or *android epistemology* – agreeing on a concept-syntagma – *Philosophy of Information* – and seen as the result of reuniting four stages-phases: *the metasemantization of narratives* (the relationship/connection of the Self with external reality, resulting in the assumption of narratives perceived as additional semantized data); *the delimitation of culture* (the process of externalization/sharing of self-conceived conceptual narratives, by shifting the experience from a private, infra-subjective and anthropocentric construction to an inter-subjective and de-anthropocentric reality); *the de-physicalization of nature* (the location of the physical world within a process of virtualization and distancing); *the conceptual embodiment of the environment* including references to “semantic objects” or to the existence of “informational entities”.⁸

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 39-40.

⁷ Luciano Floridi, “What Is The Philosophy of Information?”, in *Metaphilosophy*, vol. 33, no. 1/2, January 2002.

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 130-131.

All of these agree on the reception of the *Philosophy of Information* as “a field that deals with the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, its use and its sciences, and with the elaboration and application of theoretical and computational methodologies of information to philosophical problems”.⁹ Luciano Floridi insists upon a set of clarifications-warnings, in the sense that, on the one hand, the field provides the operational frameworks of a critical investigation by not overlapping with quantitative data theory (*information theory*), the information cumulating the nature of a primary phenomenon with particulariz(ing) dynamics, privileged in favor of calculus, with the latter received only as one of (or the most) important process involving information, in the logic of equivalence of meaning – “there is a philosophy of information, rather than just of calculus, in the same sense in which epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge, not just of perception”.¹⁰ On the other hand, the conceptual vocabulary plus-solidified by the very “reformulation of any philosophical problem in informational terms” remains relevant; as does the applied methodology which makes the *Philosophy of Information* a paradigmatic field/turn¹¹ positioned on the limit between the Aristotelian primacy of the object and the Cartesian-Kantian methodological meaning, decreed by Luciano Floridi, precisely on these grounds, as a *philosophia prima*¹².

A Double Romanian Theoretical Model of the Philosophy of Information

Within the corpus of punctual and scored theorization of the *Philosophy of Information* subject, two research papers are explicitly dedicated to the aforementioned detente, both located between the active/activated and open landmarks of the subject – at the level of the 1970s – and published/printed by Editura Politică – Political Publishing House, Bucharest. These are: Victor Săhleanu, *Science and Philosophy of Information*¹³ and Virgil Stancovici, *Philosophy of Information*¹⁴.

Victor Săhleanu’s approach positions itself and specifies its role in/on the conceptual map of the field, without implementing the [mathematical theory] of communication or the disciplinary resonances of cybernetics, being, in fact, a hypostatic exposition of the concept of information done in a *scientific* manner, using the history and philosophy of science, “with methodological, ontological, anthropological and gnoseological incidence”.¹⁵ The notion of information is interrelated to a system of contractual applications in an open series of concepts

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 137.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 138.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 139.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 141-142.

¹³ Victor Săhleanu, *Știința și Filozofia Informației [Science and Philosophy of Information]*, Editura Politică Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972.

¹⁴ Virgil Stancovici, *Filozofia Informației [Philosophy of Information]*, Editura Politică Publishing House, Bucharest, 1975.

¹⁵ Victor Săhleanu, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

such as *order, organization, system, substance, energy*, considering the warn(ing) that “information theory, which can provide useful elements to the theory and metatheory of science, *cannot* replace philosophy”¹⁶.

The applied analytical filter targets the incidental angle of the reception of history (by reference to the technique/method of staging it following the tradition of informational criteria), both as human history and as social history – ontology of informational links – part of the biological evolution within which the informational elements assert primacy, establishing that *the cybernetics of history* and *informational cybernetics* become particular histories of influence networks and recurrent *feed-back* circuits; and that in the field of cultural history, the history of the means of communication represents “more than a section of the history of technology”.¹⁷ Informational criteria are added to substantial, energetic and morphological ones, warning that “the information explosion seems more difficult to master than the population explosion”; the fundamental problem consists not in the use of information deposits, but in the circulation of their forms of knowledge, in the optimal connection of “one’s own thinking tool (brain) to the information tools (living – human or technical) of society”.¹⁸

While examining the social information on the economy and the science of leadership both ideologically and politically, the evidence reported by Victor Săhleanu converges towards the overlap between social man and *Homo informationalis*, as well as *Homo algorithmicus*, by passing through certain stages of accumulation of dynamics that provide: the systemic schemes of society, with inputs and outputs; the structure, and model of social action, in whose sphere the informational relationship distinctly represents (in relation to the gnoseological and ontological relationship) a segment of a cognitive process, but also a premise of praxiological relationship; the increase/size of the amount of information as a condition for maintaining complex dynamic systems; the problem of balance and stabilization; the conceptualization of social information, as an informative (communicative) – command – organization – recurrent (*gnoseoinformatic*) landmark; the direct relationship established between the information revolution and the informatics of society.¹⁹

Victor Săhleanu includes in the debate, in an extended context, Karl W. Deutsch’s socio-economic-politological perspective, meaningfully accrediting the cybernetic approach with plus-value through individualiz(ing) models focused on communication and self-regulation, capitalizing on self-regulating communications network arranged in discrete units, able to learn through a shift of emphasis, “information being an invariant, a sum of the peculiarities common to all the descriptions and physical processes by which it was transmitted”; in fact, a structural *pattern* of the relationship between events²⁰. From the physical character of the information to the stratification or hierarchy of its finalities, Victor Săhleanu

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 221-222.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 224-225.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 225-226.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 228.

individualizes, in the same manner as Karl. W. Deutsch, *the spirit* – physically self-sustaining process of renewing the information sector – and *the values* – logical/tactical elements of the spiritual world – both having as their point of interest the informational outline of the system: “(...) politics deals with the decisions of social life. The basic objective of politics must be to ensure self-development, accelerate learning and social innovation”²¹.

Virgil Stancovici²² places the *Philosophy of Information* in the corpus of the field of philosophy having as particular subject gnoseology and, implicitly, epistemology; he localizes the *Philosophy of Integration* after the *Philosophy of Information*, having as objective the individual(ization) of the object – subject/signal – message relationship, and highlights the ontological language that works according to the mathematical linguistic scheme, but is vertically-ontologically oriented towards the essence, germinating the cosmological language and – hence – the ethical language.²³

An absolutely necessary mention also consists, in this context, in the threefold launched warning according to which, first of all, “(...) the theory itself (*Philosophy of Information* – we note) cannot replace a genuine philosophy. (...) Philosophy is not only a theory, but also a social-moral human practice. However, it is precisely this important area of practice that remains, through the force of things, external to information theory, whose mathematical language expresses only the information entity”²⁴.

Secondly, if philosophy presupposes an act/totality/system of reflection and perception, the informational point of view remains incapable of imposing a distinct character on philosophy.

Thirdly, philosophy denotes a hierarchy of subjective values, information theory, cybernetics and systems theory being able to provide a framework for reflection, with suggestions indicating, in fact, *only* a point of view²⁵, a possible opinion. In the same ideological-political tributary framework, it is re-affirmed that “the philosophy of information represents the Marxist re-discussion of the theory of knowledge in the light of the meanings of information”²⁶ (!), (re)placed in the

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 230.

²² Virgil Stancovici, *quoted work*.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²⁴ The 1980s propose, in this regard, two other analytical interpretations.

The first metaphorically re-conceptualizes what Radu Bagdasar defined as *Informatica mirabilis* (Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1982), considering that the *spirit of finesse* and the *geometric spirit* interfere in a functional, dialectically dynamic systemic unit (p. 18), cyber-art – computer art defining the coordinates of neohumanism, germinated by “the existence of yet unmet aesthetic needs (...), the role of aesthetics – experimental science being to promote art and computer literature as the main way of reducing what we could call the fundamental aesthetic contradiction (of course, a non-antagonical contradiction) of our age” (p. 34).

The second opinion belongs to Luca-Dan Șerbanăți and Cristian Giumale (*Artificial Intelligence*, Technical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1985), ascribing to the futurological perspective (at the time of the 1980s), the way in which “knowledge will become a new type of raw material, within specific processing processes, having logical reasoning as its main operation, and knowledge processors as main tools in these processes” (p. 112), all of which articulate the identifiable future in a/through a “machine with a new architecture and electronic technology, but also with a new conception of its positioning” (p. 114).

²⁵ Virgil Stancovici, *quoted work*, p. 16.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

actual intermediate space of “the logical and comparative analysis of the *input* informational universe and of the *output* informational universe”.²⁷ Virgil Stancovici fixes the fundamental informational act between these limits, meant to highlight the logical conditions of the *datum* of the real – a return, in fact, to a three-phased philosophy reuniting Aristotle & Kant & Marx.

*From Mole to Snake:
Philosophy of Information and Democracy*

Paul Nemitz and Matthias Pfeffer, in *The Human Imperative. Power, Freedom and Democracy in the age of Artificial Intelligence*²⁸ dedicate an ample chapter to the issue and problematization of the public sphere and democracy. If we accepted, in agreement with the authors, a starting point/confirmation of the normative applicability of the public sphere that J. Habermas²⁹ theorized, it would consist in the functioning premise of the *World Wide Web*, as a space (inter)maintaining the *free medium* of cyberspace, in the sense of a transaction free of any constraint – everyone can exchange information with anyone! The premise of organization and operation reintegrated, against the background of the 1960s, the equation of an active and activated counter-public, a promoter of non-dominant communication, close to the ideal Habermasian model and, most importantly, tributary to the criticism of marketing-at-any-price and the deforming pressures of public sphere freedom; an intention subsequently diverted, as contrary to the issued perspective, *www.* is now being perceived – extended and in most of its extensions – as one of the greatest threats to freedom and democracy.

The key pillars of the theory of communicative action presented by J. Habermas³⁰ highlight rational and communicative action as instrumental formulas, recalibrating the bringing in/together of the necessary and imperative means for achieving specific objectives, with communicative action aiming to reach an agreement among actors through the recognition of the accumulation of consensual grounds. Intersubjectivity thus becomes the central, constitutive, and perpetua(ting) aspect of democracy. The mutations operated and identified within contemporary democracies denote, on the one hand, the decline of the press and of classical media and information means; and on the other hand, an encouragement for intensive use of social networks and media channels, through disinterest in classical information and ignoring critical journalism, thus justifying the evidence of an *audience 2.0* distanced from the public space as a critical *locus* and engaged in distribution mechanisms, as it responds to the *economy of attention*.

The warning issued by Paul Nemitz and Matthias Pfeffer is a trenchant one, in the sense that “the strategies of the counter-public sphere from the first moments

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

²⁸ Paul Nemitz, Matthias Pfeffer, *The Human Imperative. Power, Freedom and Democracy in the age of Artificial Intelligence*, Ethics International Press, 2023, pp. 291-321.

²⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991.

³⁰ *Idem*, *Conștiință morală și acțiune comunicativă [Moral conscience and communicative action]*, All Educational Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000.

of existence of cyberspace are now used by anti-system forces to build parallel *online* public spheres”, augmenting *fake* and *deep* phenomena, *post-truths*, conspiracies and manipulations³¹, eroding the very foundation of the structured public sphere, unable to respond to its own reason for being and to fulfill the deliberative model of democracy; these major dysfunctions are being recognized both in the accumulation of *communication pathologies* and in the enslavement of the *online* model to the imperatives of economic capital, powers that intervene directly in the generation and distribution of content. All these are decreed as harmful contexts, in the counter-direction of any functional democracy³²: “The digital public sphere is a public space whose size, architecture and propagation is subject to constant change, without its parameters being determined by users. (...) Those who organize the flow of information accumulate significant power. Interventions are increasingly replacing the open structure of communication in favour of structures that allow, first of all, the monitoring and then the marketing of participants, their communication and their entire *Lebenswelt*. (...) the public is the communication, increasingly determined by the economic imperatives of a few platform operators; the participants themselves must pay the price of participation in the form of personal data, to the extent that their freedom and self-determination are increasingly undermined. The asymmetry of knowledge, authority and power leads to a deformation of the public sphere that far exceeds (...) classical distortions”³³.

The mentioned symptomatology includes “communicative liquefaction of politics”, digital manipulation, digital paternalism, faulty interference of personalization and universalization, control of algorithms and behaviours, all of which are perceived as formulas of “*functional intrusion*, through the imperatives of the market economy, into the *internal logic* of the human imperative”³⁴. According to Jürgen Habermas, the essential condition for which political communication mediated in the public sphere can facilitate processes of deliberative legitimacy in complex societies is the targeting of a self-regulated and independent media system, in relation to social media. Only in this context can the public provide *feedback*, located in the space between/amongst the informed discourse of the elite and that of a receptive civil society.³⁵ The “general” public is replaced by a proliferating public, multiplied in/by sub-publics, leading to the loss of their

³¹ Maik Fielitz and Holger Marcks start from the research hypothesis that social networks are being used and offer a construct for undermining the landmarks of the *open society*, resorting to the identification and analysis of digital fascism, considered “a fluid and ambivalent variant of fascism which lacks a clear organizational center, the digitally connected masses being the engine of their own manipulation”, an organic and strategic social phenomenon integrated into social network ecosystems, a justifier of illiberal policies and promoter of “palingenetic ultranationalism” and digital culture of hatred. See Maik Fielitz and Holger Marcks, *Digital Fascism: Challenges for the Open Society in Times of Social Media*, July 16, 2019, <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/87w5c5gp>, accessed on 13 January 2026.

³² Paul Nemitz, Matthias Pfeffer, *quoted work*, p. 314.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 319.

³⁵ Jürgen Habermas, “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research”, in *Communication Theory*, Volume 16, Issue 4, November 2006, pp. 411–4 26.

community of beliefs – once seen as the foundation of democracy. The immediate consequence is that the common space is replaced by/through a confused multitude of personalized bubbles, validating the assertion that the domination and automation of power erodes and vulnerabilizes the democratic public. Hence the alternative of an *algocracy*, within which algorithms become detentes involved in the control of political processes, through the very substance that the term involves, that of selecting, measuring and deciding³⁶.

The resulting verdict is tributary to the evaluative-critical perspective on the *Philosophy of Information*, in the sense that “democracy could end up being the victim of technologically-catalyzed demagogy. And this is a dialectic of the digital. After all, a technology that promises the greatest possible participation and acceleration can ultimately lead to a general political offense and total regression.”³⁷

G. Franck³⁸ identifies the practical manifestations of the *economy of attention* theory as a reality, in the sense that the logic of the mass media views celebrity as a key manifestation of the accumulation of attention capital, through exchanging information and entertainment for attention, or monetization through advertising (dissemination figures and audience numbers, ratings, likes, views, etc.). *The economy of attention* becomes the foundation of “mental capitalism” in which the relations of production reverse the relationship between the material and the mental world, valuing dematerialization and virtualization. The operable triad consists of the relationship *provocateur – personal(izing) – scandal(izing)* – as a dynamic of overloading emotional factors, with public opinion becoming a systemic part of a society devoid of normative components, guided by “rules of attention”, and with the economy of entertainment decisively contaminating the public/political sphere. What prevails consists of two other imperative formulas/forms: *problems created by technology can be solved only through technology* – an assertion that excludes philosophy, and implicitly democracy, from the actual *log on* relationship with technology/information – and the Internet, which represents an environment imposing a different – alternative decision-making rationality, recalibrating a return to the operational dictum – *the protection of the public sphere is the basis of democratic governance objectives, including/especially in the digital age*.

In the corpus of naming and emphasising some benchmark models considered part of a contemporary, functional and applicable mental experiment, Paul Nemitz and Matthias Pfeffer³⁹ assign to the *Philosophy of Information* both the Kantian categorical imperative and the Jonas-ian sustainability imperative, involving in the debate “Habermas’s fiction about a discourse liberated from domination”; while also individualizing John Rawls – in the relationship between the *Philosophy of Information and democracy* – and referencing his terms of creating fair conditions for all members of society; but also through an objective-substantial

³⁶ Paul Nemitz, Matthias Pfeffer, *quoted work*, p. 321.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 327.

³⁸ G. Franck, “The economy of attention”, in *Journal of Sociology*, 55 (1), 2018, pp. 8-19.

³⁹ Paul Nemitz, Matthias Pfeffer, *quoted work*.

rational point of view which confirms the evidence that values and norms can be rationally justified and are therefore, in principle, universal.⁴⁰

In an introductory (over)take on the *Philosophy of Information*, Patrick Allo, Bert Baumgaertner, Simon D'Alfonso, Nir Fresco, Federico Gobbo, Carson Grubaugh, Andrew Iliadis, Phyllis Illari, Eric Kerr, Giuseppe Primiero, Federica Russo, Christoph Schulz, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Matteo Turilli, Orlin Vakarelov, Hector Zenil⁴¹ complete the group picture of American cyberneticists – a community created on the theories of Turing and Shannon, while accepting an almost-identical, but “more distanced” core system of French philosophers to whom the extension of certain themes of debate, but also the accumulation of “philosophical consequences of the ideas of Turing and Shannon” are attributed: Raymond Ruyer, Gilbert Simondon, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard. From the plethora which the debate attracted – by ricochet! –, the authors insist on one philosopher and one pivotal text for the mentioned references – Deleuze and *Postscript on the Societies of Control* (1990), a landmark that they consider a “short but complex work of analysis of the relationship between information systems, but also what the control of these systems (in the *hard*, political sense) could mean for democracy and politics (...) to express the way in which human communication is divided between information systems”⁴². The reference [here] has a twofold directory meaning: the first refers to the explicit appointment of a philosopher as director of the field; and the second provides the only explicit reference and referral to democracy, to which the manual will resort.

In a Foucaultian sense, the history/historical record of a warn(ing) philosophical opinion positioned within a generalized crisis targeting the accumulation of closing environments, but also the way in which *control societies* substitute disciplinary societies, would show the contextual plus-relevance of G. Deleuze⁴³ and would consist precisely in reuniting logic and program, indicative chapters for a sum of records marked in/through a set of identifiable differences.

Inside *the logic of if, if* disciplinary societies encapsulate the signature (way of designating the individual) and the administrative number/numbering (formula for indicating the position in the corpus of *the mass*), in control societies the code prevails – as a password replacing the keywords regulating disciplinary societies.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 426.

⁴¹ Patrick Allo, Bert Baumgaertner, Simon D'Alfonso, Nir Fresco, Federico Gobbo, Carson Grubaugh, Andrew Iliadis, Phyllis Illari, Eric Kerr, Giuseppe Primiero, Federica Russo, Christoph Schulz, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Matteo Turilli, Orlin Vakarelov, Hector Zenil, *quoted work*.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, May, 1990, in *Deleuze Seminars*, <https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/resource/gilles-deleuze-postscript-on-societies-of-control/>, accessed on 26 February 2026.

⁴⁴ Colin Koopman evaluates (considering the Deleuze-ian suggestions evaluated as *famous* and *obscure*!) control societies, in a sequence of philosophical-spatial hypostases of the concept – *protocolary control* (Alexander Galloway); *noopolitics* (Maurizio Lazzarato); *biopower of communication* (Tiziana Terranova); *tactical mass-media* (Rita Raley); *soft biopolitics* (John Cheney-Lippold); *data power* (Grégoire Chamayou); *psycho-socio-power* (Bernard Stiegler); *metric power* (David Beer); *#datapolitik* (Davide Panagia); *politics of possibility* (Louise Amoore); *expositive power of the digital age* (Bernard Harcourt), etc. – recovering the perspective issued by Wendy Hui Kyong Chun (in *Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006), according to which “Deleuze’s interpretation of control societies reduces them to being merely persuasive, although one could argue that they are paranoid,” in the sense that

If “the *disciplinary man* was a discontinuous producer of energy, the *control man* is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network”, thus establishing the operating coordinates of the subject-individual. If simple, status-determined machines were meant to fit any type of society in a classical manner, disciplinary societies co-engage energy-based machines, control societies operating through computers, “whose passive danger is jamming and whose active danger is piracy and the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution has to be a more profound mutation of capitalism, an already well-known or familiar mutation which can be summed up as follows: 19th – century capitalism is a capitalism of concentration, for production and for property”⁴⁵ in the sense that production capitalism becomes one of a higher order, a capitalism for the product. If control mechanisms target the short term, with fast, continuous and unlimited rates of rotation, discipline is of long duration, infinite and discontinuous, outlining the profile of the *indebted man*. In this context, “the computer tracks the position of each person – licit or illicit – and performs a universal modulation”⁴⁶, a system operable within/in the *penitentiary system* (including electronic control), in the *school system* (the integration of the “corporation” at all levels of schooling), in the *hospital system* (in the context of “no doctor or patient” medicine, replacing the body with a numerical substitute/code) and in the *corporate system* (new ways of managing money, profit and the human factor). The metaphor is one of transgression from mole to snake – “the coils of a snake being more complex than the burrows of a mole”⁴⁷.

*Instead of Conclusions: the Relationship between
Philosophy – Information – Democracy – a Metaphorical-Poetic Report*

P. Bisconti, M. Prand, F. Pierucci, F. Giarrusso, M. Bracale, M. Galisai, V. Suriani. O. Sorokoletova, F. Sartore, D. Nardi⁴⁸ recalibrate the perspective on the digital subject/object, anchoring the experiment used – the object/poetic form works like a *jailbreak* operator (a process of deliberately manipulating inputs to induce the circumvention of safety constraints, whether ethical or legal, through contextual roles or settings, operable in a fictitious setting), identifiable by danger, manipulation, loss of control, or cyber offensive. All these are positioned in the report of the subject-poet (tributary to Plato’s exclusion perspective in the *Republic* for the way in which mimetic language can distort judgment and lead society to collapse) with a systemic *pattern* (with attributes recognized in: high intermodel

Deleuze “overestimates the power of control systems” – a perspective resulting from the tendency “not to look to the past with the empirical rigor of genealogy, but rather toward the future, in a manner of eschatological prediction”. Deleuze’s reflections excel in anxiety, yielding to an avant-garde which already brands the theorists of new media and control – see Colin Koopman, *How we became our Data: A Genealogy of the Informational Person*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2019, p. 17.

⁴⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *quoted work*.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ P. Bisconti, M. Prand, F. Pierucci, F. Giarrusso, M. Bracale, M. Galisai, V. Suriani. O. Sorokoletova, F. Sartore, D. Nardi, *Adversarial Poetry as a Universal Single-Turn Jailbreak Mechanism in Large Language Models*, <https://arxiv.org/html/2511.15304v1>, accessed on 1 March 2026.

transferability; use of a standardized meta-suggestion; replication rates of responses up to three times higher than prose equivalents; model evaluation through three instances – GPT-OSS, placeholder, placeholder, etc.), tributary to the assertion that “poetic formatting can reliably bypass alignment constraints”. The approach files 20 adversarial poems/“harmful requests reformulated in poetic form” evaluated in *Google, OpenAI, Anthropic, Deepseek, Qwen, Mistral AI, Meta, xAI and Moonshot AI*⁴⁹, agreeing on the fact that “adversarial poetic requests cover an exceptionally wide area of attack, including CBRN, manipulation, intrusions into private life, generation of disinformation and even facilitation of cyber attacks. Their magnitude indicates that the vulnerability is not related to any specific content domain. Rather, it seems to stem from the way in which artificial intelligence models process poetic structure: condensed metaphors, stylized rhythm, and unconventional narrative framings that collectively disrupt or bypass pattern-matching heuristics”.⁵⁰

The mechanism is subsumed to a functionality arranged in/on two levels, recognized by the conjugation of a strictly controlled adversarial-poetic framing with a balanced refusal behaviour, validating the way in which – experimentally – the decrease in the effectiveness of the safety protocols, the vulnerability/vulnerability of the models and the circumvention of heterogeneous risks are all highlighted. The quantified results converge on the evidence that “when harmful suggestions are expressed in lyrics, rather than in prose, the success rates of attacks increase sharply”, identifying a structural (and less specific) phenomenon allowing for gaps in current evaluation practices, with safety filters tributary to prosaic surface forms; these results also insist on the assessment of mechanisms capable of maintaining the stability/safety of heterogeneous linguistic regimes⁵¹, reconfiguring – *also on a metaphorical level!* – the relationship/rapport between *philosophy – information – democracy*.

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⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

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